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PATENTING A PRINCIPLE.
THE opinions of professional men are far from being settled,
apparently, upon all the questions involved in patenting a principle. " Perhaps there are not many who .suppose that having discovered such a principle entitles the discoverer to appropriate it
under a patent, provided he has reduced it to practice. The current of decisions has been so uniform in recognising the title as
belonging to. the one who has first made a useful application of a
law pf nature; and upon that ground alone, that a person can.
hardly be found who believes the title to be strengthened in consequence of having brought the law to light. A much greater
diversity of sentiment exists as to the extent-of the right which
the individual acquires in the'principle so applied, and the forn
in which a patent should be expressed in'order to protect the
right. On the one hand it seems to be held that he is entitled to
the exclusive use of the principle, when employed for the same
purpose by whatever instrumentalities the purpose is effected;
and that the patent should expressly claim, not only the instrumentalities adopted by the patentee, but also the use of the principle for the purpose however applied. Others believe that, haying shown by what means the principle can be mad.e to accomplish
the object, the patent, although it covers only those means in
express terms, yet confers an exclusive privilege in the employment of the principle to accomplish the object, let the means
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resorted to be ever so different. On the other hand it is regarded
by many as well settled, that he who has invented a method by
which a property of matter can be, for the first time, rendered
useful for a particular purpose, is entitled to a patent for the
method, or process or mechanism which he has contrived, and
that he can set up no claim to anything more, nor vindicate a
riglit to anything more.
Several things have contributed to this discordance of sentiment. One of the most prominent is a misapprehension of the
effect and bearing of some of the cases on the subject. It is not
niecessary t6 engage in an exhaustive discussion of all the reported
decisions in which the question is involved ; but some examination
of a few of the leading ones seems to be' requisite in order to
render it clear.
From the earliest date the established doctrine of the English
courts has been.that a principle cannot be patented. It has been
pronounced from the bench times without number, has been uniformly.assumed as the law, and has never once been questioned
since Hornblower v. Bot'ton was determined. - It appears- to
have been uiade the subject of consideration forlthe first time in
two suits brought upon Watt's patent for. his steam-engne. In
one of them, Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 2 H. B. 463, and Day.
Pat. Cas. 162, the court were divided in their construction of the
patent, and consequgntly no judgment was ever rendered. All
were agreed in condemning the idea that a principle could' be
patented, and two of the judges interpreted the grant as embracing
a monopoly of a principle, and held it to be void on that ground.
The other two understood it to 'cover only the structure of. ihe
engine, and therefore maintained its validity. Lord Chief Justice
EYRE uttered the following noticeable sentiments on the occasion:
"Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle. But
for a principle so far embodied and'connected with corporal substances, as to be in a condition to act, and to produce effects in
any art, trade, mystery or manual occupation, I think there may
be a patent. Now this is, in my judgment, the thing for which the
patent was granted; and -this is what the specification describes,
though it miscalls it a principle. It is not that the patentee conceived an abstract notion that the consumption of steam in fireengines may be lessened, but he has discovered a practical method
if doing it; and for that practical method of doing it 'he has
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taken out a patent. Surely this is a very different thing. from
taking out a patent for a principle." The expression "a principle
embodied and connected with corporal substances," &c., may have
had some part in originating the idea that the principle itself is
what may be patented. It may be doubted whether the distinction between a principle embodied in a maferial structure, and a
machine embodying a principle, was in his lordship's mind at all.
If it was, the latter 'part of the quotation shows that it was the
machine he contemplated: he says it was "for that practical
"method of doing it he has taken out his patent."
Having failed to establish their title in that suit; the plaintiffs
brbught another, which was subsequently carried by writ of error
to the Court of King's Bench, and is reported by the name of
fornblower v. Boulton, 8 T. R. 99.' Judgment was given in
their favor upon the sole ground that the patent was for a machine,
and not for a principle, as may be seen from the following language of Lord KENYON, 'Chief -Justice : "' By comparing the
patent and the manufacture together, it evidently appears that
the patentee claims a monopoly for an engine, or a machine composed of material parts, which are to produce the effect described."
"But having heard everything that can be said on the -subject,
I have no doubt in saying that this is a patent for a manufacture,
which I understand to be something made by the hand of man."
LAWRENCE, J.; rested the same conclusion upon the language of
the Akct of Parliament, under which the patent had been extended;
saying, "From this it is clear that the legislature understood that
the patent was for an engine for some mecanical contrivance."
The other judges concuried in these views, and, notwithstanding
the strenuous efforts of the counsel to sustain the patent upon the
ground that a principle could be patented, they emphatically condemned, the position.
Passing over several cases; which will be adverted to in the following pages, the case of .ZVreil8on v. .Harford,1 W. P. 0. 278,
and 8 M. & W. 806, -next demands attention, The action was
brought upon the patent for using the hot-blast in smelting iron,
and the like, and was considered at great length in the Court of
Exchequer Chamber. The court were chiefly occupied with the
objection, that the patent represented the form of the vessel in
which the air is heated to be immaterial, and this the jury had
found was not true, certainly in one sense. It was also urged
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that the patent was for a principle; and respecting this Baron
PARKE, who pronounced the opinion, made -these observations:
"Then taking the construction of this specification upon ourselves,
as we are bound to do, it becomes necessary to examine what the
nature of the invention is which the plaintiff has disclosed by this
instrument. It is very difficult to distinguish it froft a patent
foi a princile,and this at first created in the minds of some
of the ourt muich difficulty; but, after full consideration, we think
the plaintiff does not -merely claim a principle, but a machine
embodying a principle, and 'a very valuable one. We think the
case must be considered as if, the principle being well 'known,
the plaintiff had first "invented a mode of applying -it by a
mechanical apparatus to a furnace. And his invention then consists in this, by interposing a receptacle for heated air between
the blowing apparatus and the furnace" (W. P. C. 870, 871).
It is difficult-to see how'.they could have more emphatically denied
that a.principle can be patented. The inventor had brought to
light a.property of matter of immense value, and had rendered it
practicable. If there was ever a case in which such a discovery
should be pr6tected it'was this, and the court"were.' evidently
actuated by an earnest desire . to secure. to the' discoverer his
reward. Yet they found themselves- compelled to put a forced
interpretati6n upon his grant, and to, construe it as covering the
structure he employed, because they could not, with due regard
to their legal convictions, allow him to monopolize the propeity.
of mattei. They'add this pregnant remark: "We think the case
must be considered as if, the principle being well known, the plain.
tiff had first invented a mode of applying it." They gi~e.him
no credit for having been the first to eliminate it, aid make it
known. They estimate his merit by the application which he had
made of it, and by that alone.
The same patent came under consideration soon after in TIe
.ifousehill-Co. v. _Neilson, W. P. C. 673, a case which requires a
more careful examination, perhaps, than. any other on the subject,
both on account of the erroneous significance *which has -been
attached to it, and the influence it has exerted in misle.adinA
many of the profession. It was tried first by the Court of Sessions in Scotland, Lord Justice Clerk HoPE presiding, and then
on appeal by the House of Lords. The defendants.undertook to
raise questions which involved the objection that the patent was
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for an abstract principle, and therefore void. Lord HoPE there.
upon (p. 677) expressed his convictibn that they were .not at
liberty under the pleadings, or issues as settled, to go into that
defence. On inspecting the issues (p. 674), it will be clearly
seen that no such point was raised. Nevertheless, in order to
enable the defendants to carry up the question, he concluded tc
entertain the objection, and treat it as if it were legitimately
before him. Accordingly he proceeded to instruct the jury, in
.unqualified terms, that the plaintiff, having discovered the principle, and shown how it might be applied usefully, was entitled to
a patent for the principle. All this, however, was on the erroneous hypothesis that the objection had been properly taken.
It has been said, however, that this ruling of Lord HoPE's was
affirmed upon the hearing of the appeal before the House of Lords.
It is true that 'all the exceptions taken by the defendants to his
Lordship's instrudions were overruled on that occasion, saving
one, which has no bearing on the question under consideration.
The reason is to be learned from a foot note to the report, on p.
711. From that it appears that, when the counsel for the appel.
lanti (the defendants below); approached this part of the case,
the Law Lords expressed such a decided conviction that the objection to the patent on account of its being for a principle, could
not be raised )nder the pleadings .and issues, that the objection
was abandoned.
And in accordance with this we find 'Lord
CAMPEiE.L interposing in the course of the argument, and asking
the counsel for the appellants "what issue have you oni this record
to raise the question of the patent being for' a principle ?" And
after some further conversation he told them "You might have
pleaded that it was a patent for a principle, and not for any particular mode of applying a principle. There is no issue for the
direction- of the judge upon that point:" pp. 701, 702. And
Lord LYNDHTURST mentioned, in delivering his opinion, tlkat he
understood the counsel to abandon that defence (p. 711).: The
decision below was affirmed, nevertheless, because, sinqe the
defendants could not raise the question at all, they were not
injured by an adverse ruling respecting it, and could not allege
it as an error, so as to set aside the judgment. The whole
authority of the case, therefore, rests upon the instructions given
by Lord HoPE to the jury, hypothetically and upon a supposition
that had no foundation, as he himself believed.
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Among the American cases on this subject two are prominent:
those of Le Boy v. Tathtam, 14 How: 156; and O'1?eill/ v.
Morse, 15 How. 62.
In the first of these the patentees described in their specification a property of lead, which had been discovered by them, viz.:
thai, if divided when just congealed, and then pressed together
while still hot, the edges will unite. This they had' reduced to
practice in a machine for making lead pipe, and it was found to
be a valuable improvement.' Judge McLEAN, who gave the opinion of the majority of the court, interpreted the patent as
embracing the machine only, and as they determined that to have
been anticipated, they condemned the paten6t. The minority put
a different construction upon the grant. They held that it appropriated the newly discovered property of lead, and that the plaintiff had a right to so appropriate it, and ought to recover Lord
HoPE's -views were greatly relied upon, and it was evidently supposed that they had been sanctioned by the House of Lords. It
should be observed, further, in order that the bearing of this case
may be fully understood, that, in O'Reilly v. Morse (which was
decided the next year), Chief Justice TANEY said that it was held
by the court in Le Boy v. Tatham,-that the plaintiff "1was not
entitled to a patent for this newly discovered principle, or quality,
in lead, and that such a discovery was not patentable :" p. .17.
It would seem, therefore, that the doctrine of the miiority on this
point was not acquiesced in by their colleagues, though it was
Dassed.over in the opinion given for the majority.
The patent came under the consideration of the court again in
the case of Le Boy v. Tatham, 22 How. 182, and wad sustained
in consequence of a new view which was taken of it. In delivering the opinion -of the court, Judge McLEAN took occasion to
declare, in emphatic terms, that Lord HOPE'S doct'rine was not
law in this country.
In O'Reilly v. Morse, the principal question arose upon the
eighth claim in the patentee's specification. It was expressed in
these words, viz.: "The use of the motive power of the electrid,
or galvanic current, however developed, for making or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distance." The
patentee did not pretend to have been' the first one who had discovered that the electric current would produce motion at a distance. But he did claim, and truly, to have contrived a mechau.

PATENTING A PRINCIPLE.

tm, or process, whereby it could be un'ade to print characters at
a distance. He set up a claim, therefore, to the exclusive right
of doing this by any process or machinery whatever. This claim
the court negatived in the most unequivocal terms, and Chief
Justice TANEY, in delivering their judgment, used this language,
which will bear repetition: "Whoever discovers that a certain
useful result will be produced in any art, machine, manufacture,
or composition of maiter by the use of certain means, is entitled
to a patent for it, provided he specifies the means he uses in a
manner so full and exact that any one skilled in the science to
which it appertains can, -by using the means he specifies, without
anyr addition to, or subtraction from them, produce precisely the
result he describes. And if this cannot be done by the means
he describes, the patent is void; and if it can be done, then the
patent confers .on hiin the exclusive right to use the means he
specifies to produce the result or effect he describes, and nothing
more. And it makes no differende, in this respect, whether the
effect is produced by chemical agency or combination, or by the
application of discoveries or principles . in natural philosophy,
known or unknown before his invention, or by machinery acting
altogether on mechanical principles.
In either case lie must
describe the manner or process as above mentioned, and the end it
accomplishes. And any one may lawfully accomplish the same
end, without iifringing the patent, if he uses means substantially
different from those described :" p. 119. And he also declared
that the doctrine of Lord HoPE is not law in this country.
After the *elaborate discussion and full -consideration which
these, cases underwent in the Supreme Court, it can hardly be
required to examine at length those in whicli the subject has been
touched upon in the Circuit Courts. What was said in substance
respecting them by TANEY, C. J., in O'Beilly v. Morse, will answer
the purpose. The earlier decisions are in uniform accordance
with the ruling in that case, and the idea of patenting a prmciple
is never mentioned but to be denounced. (See Evans vi Eaton,
Pet. C. C. 341 ; Stone v. Sprague, 1 Story 272; WryetTh v. Stone,
Id. 285; Blanchardv. Sprague,2 Id. 166,170; 8 Sumn. 536, 540;
American -PinCo,. v. Oakville Pin Co., 3 Am. Law Reg. 0. S.
187, and Law's Dig. 260; Smith v. Downing, Law's Dig. 593.)
A change was undoubtedly produced by the proceedings upon
Neilson's patent, and the instructions of Lord HoPE were in seve.
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ral instances adopted as the law by the judge§ in their circuits.
Parker v. Hulme, 7 West. Law J. 419, Law's Dig. 593, and
Foote v. Silsby, 2 Blatchf. 265, may be mentioned among them.
It is a grave mistake, however, to assert that the decision upon
this question in the last case was affirmed in the Supreme Court.
The-question arose upon the first claim alone in the plaintiffts
patent; and on the hearing in the Supreme Court it was expressly
stated by the learned judge, NELSOX,'who pronounced the decision, that the first claim was found to have been anticipated, and
was not before the court: Silsby v. Foote, 20 How. 378.
Since O'Beilly v. Mforse was decided, the right to patent a
principle has never received the slightest -countenance from the
bench, but, whenever it has been adverted to, it has been denied
in unqualified terms. It was so in Le Roy v. Tatham, 22 How.
132. In Wintermute v. Redington (U. S. Cir. Ct. N. D. Ohio,
1856), a patent was tried which eminently deserved all tle favor
to which the discovery of a lew and valuable law of physics could
entitle it, it being for the well-known reaction waterwheel. Yet
the learned judge, WILsON, who presided at the..trial, used the
following ladiguage respecting' it: "If the defendant, in the use
of a reaction waterwheel, whether on a-'vertical or horizontal
shaft, whether single or in pairs, has run, or caused it to be run
by the aid of the vertical motion of the water upon the wheel in
its line of motion, he has violated the patent; provided he'bas
used, in so doing, any or all of the patentee's mechanical means
for producing that vertical motion, or mechanical equivalents for
all or dny of them to produce it."
We may *now recur to the cases which are usually referred to
.n discussing this'branch of the law, and which have been passed
over. It will be found, on examination, that they, every one of
them, involved an invention consisting exclusively in the new application of some law of mechanics, or what is equivalent to such
a law. And what were held to be infringements consisted in the
employment of what were mere mechanipal substitutes for the
devices, which the p'tentee had described in his specificatiorl.
They were neither more or less than equivalents for those devices,
at least they were so regarded by the court. It is true that the
judges frequently speak of the principle of the patented structure,
and vindicate the patentee's exclusive rigcht to it.- But the term
principle is- used by them in a qualified sense. As Judge SToRY
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said in Barrett v. Hall, "care should be taken to distinguish what
is meant by a principle. In the minds of some men, a principle
means an elementary truth or power," &c. "No one, however,
in the least acquainted with law, would. for a moment contend that
a principle in this sense is the subject of patent." "The true
legal meaning of the principle of a machine, with reference to
the Patent Act, is the peculiar structure or constituent parts of
such machine :" 1 Mass. 470. So it was said also by Judge McLEAN in Brooks y. Jencins, "The word principle is not used here
in its general signification, but as applied to the structure of a
machine. It means the operative cause by which a certain effect
is produced :" 3 McL. 451. Or; as Judge STORY defined it on
another occasion,. it means, "the modus operandii 'the peculiar
manner or device of producing any given effect :" Whittemore v.
Cutter, 1 Gall.'480. When, therefore, we find it announ'ced from
the bench that the patentee, having shown one way in which this
principle of his machine is made to work' effectively, is entitled to
the use of all 6ther ways in which it may be utilized for that purpose, we apprehend that nothing more is intended than that his
patent-shall not be evaded by what are only equivalents, for the
mechanisms he employed.
In Jupe v. Pratt,1 W. P. 0. 145, for instance, there can be
no pretence that the plaintiff had found out any new property of
matter, any law of physics, or even any new principle of mohanics. 'He had, at the mosf, made an ingenious and novel application of well-known mathematical truths.. This enables us to
understand the just import of the language used by Baron ALDERSON on that occasion, which has been so often quoted. He first
denied explicitly that a patent can be taken out for a principle.
He adds, however, "You may take out a patent for a principle,
coupled&with the mode of carrying that principle into effect, provided you have not only discovered the principle, but invented
some mode of carrying it into effect. But then you must start
with some mode of carrying it into effect; if you have d6n that,
then you are entitled to protect yourself from all other modes of
carrying the same principle into effect, that being treated by the
jury as piracy of your original invention." Now, if the learned
judge intended by principle any law of nature, then his remarks
were entirely foreign to the case. The plaintiff had made no
such discovery,' and, if he had, his discovery of it would have
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given him no property in what he discovered. But, if his Lordship is understood to be speaking of what has been sometimes
called the modus operandiof the invention, he is intelligible and
consistent, and in harmony with what has been advanced above.
The patentee of such an invention must have originated the principle in that sense. And having originated it, and described one
method.of applying it, he is entitled to all other methods of applying it. For all other methods- of applying such a principle
can be nothing more or less than substituting some equivalent or
other for the mechanical device or devices, which are embodied
in the method he has described.
So of Crossley v. Beverley, 1 W. P. C. 106, 3 C. &-P. 513.
The operation of the machine, for which the plaintiff had a patent,
depended upon a well-known law of 'hydrostatics, the tendency of
water to rise.to, the same level, wherever different bodies of it are
in free communication. "A great deal was said about the principle
of the mac'hine, the experts testifying that after the principle was
once discovered, there were a hundred ways of reducing it to
-practice. Now they could not be speaking of the law of hydrostatics, which has been known -from time immemorial. They evi.
dently meant the modus operandi,the principle of mechanism by
which that law was made to contribute to the purpose of the machine. The defendant's machine was wholly unlike the plaintiff's
in appearance, and even in construction. But 'it was shown. to
operate upon the same principle, and so was held to be an infringement. Not because he availed himself of the same law of hydr6.
statics-everybody-might make use of that. But he employed
the same niechanical principle of operation.. In otherwords, his
devices were mere mechanical equivalents for those which were
described in the plaintiff's patent.Again, in Walton v. Potter, 1 W. P. C. 585,,8 M. & G. 411,
8 Scott N. R. 91, the patentee had made no discovery of any law
of physics. He had merely made an ingenious application of the
well-known qualities of india-rubber, in order to hold the teeth of
wool-cards in a suitable position, yet have them flexible. .Hj
used for this purpose a sheet of the. gum between two layers of
cloth. The defendant used cloth enveloped in the.gum,'by having
been dipped in a solution of it and dried, and thus effected ihe
same object: and he was held to have infringed the patent.
Why? Because he used india-rubber ? Nb; but his fabric ope-
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rated on the same principle; that is, the same principle of
mechanics ; and was a mere substitute for that of the plaintiffs.
We have seen that the plaintiffs' patent in Neilson v. Hrford,
was construed to cover the process of heating the air in a vessel
placed between the blowing apparatus and the furnace. The
defendant used a vessel in that position for the same purpose ; but
the construction of it was entirely different from that of the plaintiffs. It was held, nevertheless, to be an infringement. It performed the same functions, more effectually it is true, but still the
same. In a mechanical point of view it operated on the same
principle, and was its counterpart.
It is unnecessary to go through all the cases in the English
books to which this explanation applies. One, which was determined by our own Supreme Court, deserves to be noticed here,
especially because it was considered at the same torm with
O'_eilly v. Morse, and both must have been together in the
minds of the judges'-that of Winans v. "Dennaead, 15 How.
330. The plaintiff's invention consisted in constructing coal-cars
in the form of the frustum of a cone. The defendant's cars were
octagonal instead of circular, .but otherwise resembled the plain.
tiff's. One of the judges inclined to the opinion that the 'plaintiff was, by the terms of his patent, limited to-the precise form he
had described, and could have no remedy against others who used
a different one: It was shown that there was no practical difference between the two ; but either would derive especiaL strength
from the mechanical law involved. And, though the plaintiff's
claim was, in express terms, to tht frustum'of-a cone ; though he
did not pretend to claim the mechanical law thus applied, the
defendant was held to have violated his paient. This could not
be on the ground that the principle of mechanics was patented.
It must have been on the ground that the form adopted by the
defendants was a mere equivalent for that of the plaintiff.
It may be said that what have been designated as mecl~anical
laws in the preceding pages, are in truth laws of nature, -physical
just as much as the properties of matter, and that the two classes
run into each other, so that no distinction can be made between
them. It is not necessary to insist that, there may be in theory.
In practice, there is a radical difference which fully justifies their
being considered as belonging to two classes. In the case of
inventions founded on what have been termed mechanical principles, the patentee'obtains full protection in the exclusive enjoy.
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ment of the principle by being allowed an action against every
one who uses an equivalent for his device. No machine can be
constructed on the principle of his which does not embrace such
equivalents. It may not be so where the novelty of the invention
consists in some property of matter first brought to light by the
patentee. Neilson's patent covered the use of a vessel for heating
air placed between the blower and the furnace-not the introduction of heated air into the furnace, which was truly his discovery.
If any one could have contrived to beat the air sufficiently before
.it entered the blower, he might have availed himself of Neilson's
discovery with impunity. The difficulty of doing this constituted
the whole strength of his patent. Anybody might have availed
himself of the quality of lead discovered by the Tathams, if he.
could have got up a machine of a different construction. It is
very possible that. the courts may give a larger range to the doctrine of equivalents, in order to secure to the discoverer of a new
physical property an adequate reward for his ingenuity. Thus
far, it'is only as the defendant has been found to have employed
mechanical -equivalents for the construction -specified by the.
patentee, that he has been held guilty of infringement, or the
patentee has obtained protection.
There are a few other cases upon this subject which are not.
open to the explanation given to those heretofore mentioned, and
which may be thought to require a passing notice.
The plaintiff in Forsyth v. Riviere, 1 W. P. 0. 97, aftex
describing in his specification the explosive compounds employed
by him in igniting the charge in fire-arms, added: "I do not lay
claim to the invention of any of the said compounds," &c., " my
invention-in regard thereto being confined to the use and application thereof to the purposes of irtillery and fire-arms as aforesaid.. And the manner of priming and exploding which I use
is," &c., proceeding to describe it. There was no specification
of claim. It is manifest that this patent- was for the method he
employed. It is true that the reporter says the"defendant's lock
was constructed differently; but he does not furnish the slightet
intimation in what respect it varied. The note of the case is very
short and unsatisfactory. The report, bearing the same title.in
Chit. Pr. C. 182, is upon another 'point entirely.. But from the
statement of the counsel in Mi-nter v. Wells, W. R' C. 128, we
learn that all the difference between the locks was this: in the
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patentee's the hammer struck the pan containing the composition,
and in the defendant's the pan struck the hammer.
No one can read the patent of the plaintiff in Hall v. Boot, 1
W. P. C. 100, without perceiving that he laid claim to his machinery when used in connection with gas flame. There was no
positive evidence what machinery the defendants used, it is true;
but this does not warrant the inference that the court recognised
the plaintiff's title to the exclusive use of gas flame with 'any
machinery for the same purpose. There was circumstantial proof
of the strongest kind that the defendants' was borr6wed from the
plaintiff's, and was identical with it.
The claim set up. in BoothL v. .Kennard,1 Hurls. & N. 527, was
for "inakinggas direct from seeds and matters herein named for
practical illumination, or other useful purposes, instead of making
it from bils, resins, or gums previously extracted from such substances." Upon the trial of the case, POLLOCK, C. B.,-held this
claim to be too broad, and-directed a verdict for the defendant.
The verdict was set aside in the Court -of Exchequer Chamber;
and from the rbport it would certainly seem as if the court considered the patent valid. But when the -cause came on for trial
again before Chief Baron POLLOCK, he said that the court had
decided nothing more than this: that the invention "was one
which, if -new, might be patented if properly specified."
He
added, ."we are also of opinion that the claim is too large, -and
that such claim cannot be supported." There was a verdict for
the defendant again. Bui as there was also strong evidence upon
that trial that the invention was not new,.the plaintiff probably
deemed it unsafe t6 proceed any further, *after moving that a
verdict should be entered up for him, and .being denied. Little
or no reliance is manifestly to be placed on the report of the
decision in thie Exchequer Chamber, after the explanation given
by Chief Baron POLLOCK.

The plaintiff in Seed v. Higgins, 8 Ell. & Bl. 755, 771,.and 6
Jur. N. S. 1264, had originally taken out a patent for the'application of the law or principle of centrifugal force to the particular or special purpose above set forth ;'"i. e. to fliers used for
'preparing, slubbing, or roving cotton, &c., so as to produce a
hard and evenly compressed bobbin. He afterwards discovered
that centrifugal force had been employed already for the same
purpose, though by different means; and he therefore filed a
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disclaimer, by which be limited himself to the mecnian:sm he had
described in his specification. Upon this a questioi. _tr~se whether
his patent did not, when thus amended, appropriate a different
invention from anything embraced in his original specification,
and was not therefore void. The case was very fully discussed
in several courts, but was finally decided against the plaintiff
up6n the ground that the defendant's machine was no infringement
of the patent. In the course of delivering their opinions it was
incidentally mentioned by one or more of the judges, that the
defendant's machine came within the purview of the patent as
6riginally framed. But there was no opinion expressed throughout as to the validity of the original patent, nor any allusion made
to the subject. If it may be inferred from the silence observed
respecting it that the validity of the instrument was admitted,
there is some propriety in referring to "the 'case when eiamining
this doctrine. It will probably be regarded by most as of no
weight whatever.
The court interpreted the second claim made by the plaintiff,
iff Bovill v. Keyworth, 7 Ell. & Bl. 724; to be for "exhausting
the air from the cases of the millstones, combined with the application of a blast to the grinding surfaces."? Upon this Lord
CAMPBELL, who presided, remarked as follows, viz.: " Still if the
specification does not point out the mode by which this part of
the process (No. 2) is to be conducted, so as to accomplish the
object in view, it would be a statement of a principle, and 'he
patent would be invalid." He held it to be sufficient, however.
And it may well be doubted whether it was fairly open to the
objection that it would have been for a principle without a
description of the process, though such a description was no
doubt essential. The case belongs to a class which has been
often supposed to involve the legality of patenting a principle,
but really has little to do with it. A blast and an exhaust are
two mechanical forces as well known as a stream of water or as
steam. Every artisan skilled in the-business is perfectly familiar
with them, and knows how to produce them. The invention in
this instance consisted in combining the two so as to produce'a
particular effect. After describing how this might be dpne, thg
specification defines the invention as consisting in the combination of these two forces, each applied to. a particular and wellknown mechanism. In all this we see nothing like patenting a

